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NOTES
stay close to basic principals by inquiring if the choice of rule
would substantially affect those primary decisions respecting
human conduct which our constitutional system leaves to state
regulation. If so, Erie and the Constitution require that the
state rule prevail. . . ."
It may be that Mr. Justice Harlan will not prevail, but the decision
in Hanna v. Plummer cannot help but cause renewed analysis of the con-
stitutional problems inherent in diversity jurisdiction. Whether, as Mr.
Justice Harlan fears, the court will over-react to the woodenness of York
with an equally wooden "forum shopping rule" remains to be seen. Be
that as it may, lawyers and citizens in general can applaud the re-
examination of first principles signaled by Hanna.
THE ASCERTAINMENT OF STATE LAW IN A
FEDERAL DIVERSITY CASE
The Supreme Court of the United States in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins'
held that a federal court sitting in a diversity of citizenship case must
recognize and apply not only state statutes but also state court decisions.
The Court rejected the prior federal practice of formulating and applying,
in the absence of a controlling state statute, a federal common-law rule
which in many cases was not in conformity with the common law of the
state. Although the Court in Erie did not discuss the problem of how a
federal court should choose the state from which to draw the applicable
state law, the Court subsequently held that the federal court must ascer-
tain and apply the law, including the conflict of laws rules, of the state
in which the federal court is sitting.2 Then five years after the Erie deci-
sion, the Supreme Court in a diversity case denied a federal court the
discretion to decline to adjudicate a case involving a difficult and un-
settled question of state law.' The Court said that, in the absence of
exceptional circumstances well defined by prior case law which would
warrant the non-exercise of jurisdiction,4 it is the duty of a federal court
89. Id. at 474-5.
1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
3. Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
4. "The exceptions relate to the discretionary powers of courts of equity. An ap-
peal to the equity jurisdiction conferred on federal district courts is an appeal to the
sound discretion which guides the determinations of courts of equity. . . . Exercise of
that discretion by those, as well as by other courts having equity powers, may require
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to render a decision on the merits where diversity jurisdiction is properly
invoked regardless of the difficulty involved in ascertaining state law.5
Since Erie, the federal courts have been struggling with this problem of
ascertaining and applying state law in cases in which it is not at all clear
what the state law happens to be.
This note does not take issue with the Supreme Court's decision that
a federal court is required to ascertain and apply state law in a diversity
case; rather, it attempts to examine and evaluate the various approaches
and specific rules that have been adopted by the federal courts to facilitate
their search for state law. First, the early Supreme Court cases dealing
with Erie and the problem of ascertaining state law are examined and an
attempt is made to state the problem of ascertainment in terms of the
policy underlying Erie. Second, Nolan v. Transocean Airlines,' a recent
Supreme Court case dealing with the general approach federal courts
should adopt when ascertaining state law, is discussed and analyzed.
Third, the performance of the lower federal courts and particularly the
performance of the courts of the Seventh Circuit is examined and com-
pared with the standards suggested by the opinion of the Supreme Court
in the Nolan case."
I. THE EARLY PROBLEM OF ASCERTAINING STATE LAW
UNDER THE ERIE DOCTRINE
It is easy enough to direct the federal courts to ascertain and apply
state law, but such a direction presupposes a definition of "state law" and
almost seems to presuppose a single source to which federal courts can
look and "find" state law. In fact, there is no single source of state law;
the various sources may range from decisions and dicta of the highest
them to withhold their relief in furtherance of a recognized, defined public policy." Id.
at 235-36. The Court goes on to discuss specific cases.
5. Since this note is concerned only with the ascertainment of state law, the limits
of the abstention doctrine and the possible certification of questions to state courts are
not considered here. However, the abstention doctrine is primarily confined to cases in
which the proper ascertainment of state law might avoid the necessity of resolving a
Constitutional question. See Note, Policy and Procedure in Abstention: Is the Pullman
Technique Proper?, 40 IND. L.J. 248 (1965) ; Comment, Inter-Sovereign Certification as
an Answer to the Abstention Problen, 21 LA. L. Rxv. 777 (1961) ; Note, Abstention-
Certified Questims-Justiciability,--Federal Proceedings Postponed Until State Court De-
termines Uncertain State Law, 40 TEXAs L. REv. 1041 (1962).
6. 365 U.S. 293 (1961).
7. For a thorough examination of the ways in which federal courts ascertained and
evaluated sources of state law during the first decade following Erie, see Harnett &
Thornton, Precedent in the Erie-Tompkins Manner: A Decade in Retrospect, 24 N.Y.
U.L. REv. 770 (1949). However, the authors made no attempt to compare the methods
,adopted by the federal courts with the standards suggested by the rationale underlying
the Erie decision; and of course there has been a significant development in the case law
on this problem since that time.
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court of the state through intermediate state court decisions and even
down to trial court decisions, opinions of the state bar, and local adminis-
trative rulings. A federal court seeking to ascertain state law must choose
among these often conflicting sources of state law, rejecting some and
assigning differing weights to those sources selected. Obviously, if the
selection of sources of state law and the relative weights assigned to those
sources is not to be arbitrary, the federal courts need some overriding
criteria by which the significance of each source can be evaluated. Since
it was the Erie case which made necessary the ascertainment of state law
in the disposition of a diversity case, it seems that any generalization con-
cerning methods of evaluating sources of state law should be examined in
the light of the rationale or rationales on which the Erie decision is
grounded.
Mr. Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court in Erie, emphasized the
argument that the Constitution does not explicitly confer power on either
the Congress or the federal courts "to declare substantive rules of com-
mon law applicable in a State."8 His opinion quoted Mr. Justice Fields:
But, notwithstanding the great names which may be cited in fa-
vor of the doctrine, and notwithstanding the frequency with
which the doctrine has been reiterated, there stands, as a per-
petual protest against its repetition, the Constitution of the
United States, which recognizes and preserves the autonomy
and independence of the States-independence in their legisla-
tive and independence in their judicial departments. Supervision
over either the legislative or the judicial action of the States is
in no case permissible except as to matters by the Constitution
specially authorized or delegated to the United States. Any
interference with either, except as thus permitted, is an inva-
sion of the authority of the State and, to that extent, a denial
of its independence.'
However, subsequent Supreme Court decisions avoided the consti-
tutional argument"0 and chose instead to focus on a policy aimed at elim-
ination of the supposed evils of forum-shopping as between state and fed-
eral courts. Justice Brandeis had noted in Erie that application of fed-
eral general law often made the rights of parties depend on whether the
S. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
9. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401 (1892) (dissenting opinion).
10. For a discussion of Justice Brandeis' constitutional argument and the way in
which the Court has subsequently avoided re-examination of this point, see Kurland,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases,
67 YALE L.J. 187, 188-204 (1957).
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suit was brought in a state or federal court in a case where diversity juris-
diction could be invoked. The non-citizen plaintiff had his choice of
forum and hence his choice of law. Furthermore, since a resident plain-
tiff can create diversity jurisdiction simply by changing his citizenship
to another state or, in the case of a corporation, by re-incorporating in
another state, resident defendants were denied "equal protection of the
law""1 when federal courts refused to follow state law. This kind of
forum-shopping could only be eliminated by requiring that the outcome
of litigation in a federal court not differ from the outcome that would
result if the same case were to be tried in a state court. Perhaps the best
statement of this suggested rational of the Erie decision may be found in
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York :12
In essence the intent of that decision was to insure that, in all
cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely be-
cause of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome
of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the
same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation,
as it would be if tried in a State Court. The nub of the policy
that underlies Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins is that for the same
transaction the accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in a
federal court instead of in a state court a block away, should not
lead to a substantially different result.1
This rationale of Erie, when read literally, appears to require the federal
court to apply every state rule which is relevant to the issue before it and
which could conceivably affect the outcome of the litigation.14 Hence, it
is commonly referred to as the "outcome determinative test."
More recently, the outcome-determinative explanation of Erie set
forth by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Guarcnty Trust case has appar-
ently been qualified by the Supreme Court. In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Elec. Co-op., Inc.," the Court held that a state court rule which denied
litigants in a workmen's compensation case the right to a jury trial of
"jurisdictional facts" need not be applied in a federal diversity case in
view of the strong federal policy favoring jury trials. Although the ex-
tent to which Byrd limits Guaranty Trust is not entirely clear, indications
are that a fairly narrow limitation was intended. Guaranty Trust held
11. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 75 (1938).
12. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
13. Id. at 109.
14. See, e.g., Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLTutr. L.
Rav. 489, 512 (1954).
15. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
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that a federal court must ascertain and apply those state rules which, if
applied by the federal court, could affect the outcome of the case; that
is, the federal court must ascertain and apply outcome-determinative state
rules. However, Byrd held that some outcome-determinative state rules
should not be applied by a federal court. Most narrowly interpreted,
Byrd held only that a strong federal policy will prevail over an opposing
state rule where the state rule is not bound up with the parcel of state-
created rights making up a cause of action or defense,"6 where the state
policy embodied in the rule is weak, and where the probable effect of the
rule on the outcome of the case is minimal. By taking such pains to show
that the rule in question was not bound up with the parcel of state-created
rights and by specifically pointing out the Erie-mandated federal respect
for such state-created rights, the Court indicated that even a strong fed-
eral policy should not prevail over a rule which is bound up with the
parcel of rights making up a cause of action or defense."
Under either the Guaranty Trust or Byrd doctrines, the task of the
federal court is still to ascertain state law. The federal court must ascer-
tain that state law which if applied by the federal court would result in an
outcome in the federal court as nearly as possible identical to the outcome
which would have resulted had the litigant brought his action in the state
court system. It is only after the pertinent outcome-determinative rules
have been ascertained in this manner that the Byrd doctrine operates to
pass on the question of whether a particular outcome-determinative rule
should be applied by the federal court." Once it is determined wlat the
16. For an illuminating discussion of the parcel of rights approach to state policy,
see Note, Diversity Jurisdiction: State Policy and the Independent Federal Forum, 39
INn. L.J. 582, 592 (1964). This note also contains a thorough analysis of the Guaranty
Trust and Byrd decisions. Compare, Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208
(1939) ; the court recognized that such a rule placing the burden of proof in quiet title
actions on the attacking party, expressed a state policy designed to give a bona fide
purchaser of realty added assurance of title, and hence was intended to enlarge the
rights of such a purchaser in a quiet title action.
17. But see Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963). This case seemed to indicate
that a very strong federal policy, such as, for example, the federal policy favoring jury
trials, may prevail even over a state rule which is bound up with the parcel of state-
created rights making up a cause of action or defense. The Court in Sinler looked only
to federal policy in deciding that the appellant was entitled to a jury trial; the Court did
not mention the parcel of rights concept. However, a likely explanation for the short
cut taken by the Court is that the respondent on appeal agreed with the appellant that
federal law should determine the appellant's right to a jury trial despite the decision of
the court of appeals that Oklahoma law governed. The point then was not argued before
the Supreme Court. The respondent merely argued that, applying federal law, the action
was "equitable" and not "legal." The Court disagreed with respondent on this latter
point.
18. For example, a state rule making communication between husband and wife
privileged and hence inadmissible manifests a state policy which was not intended to be
an integral part of a particular cause of action or defense. The policy behind such a
rule is aimed at the protection of marriages generally. A federal court in deciding
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federal court must do, the question remains: How should a federal court
go about extracting outcome-determinative state rules from the various,
possibly conflicting sources of state law?
In the Erie case, Justice Brandeis, writing for the court, made ref-
erence only to the law of the state as "declared by its legislature in a
statute or by its highest court in a decision"' 9 as sources of state law. As
a result, after Erie federal courts continued their practice of applying
"general law" in diversity cases when there was no applicable state statute
and no controlling decision rendered by the state's highest court." How-
ever, in a series of decisions during the 1940 term, the Supreme Court
limited the freedom of a federal court to ignore decisions of inter-
mediate state appellate courts. In Fidelity Union Trust v. Field,2 the
Court held that, in the absence of "more convincing evidence"22 of state
law, the lower federal court must follow two decisions of the Chancery
Court of New Jersey"5 in which two state vice-chancellors independently
invalidated Totten Trusts despite the plain words of a New Jersey statute
allowing Totten trusts.2 4 In West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.," decided
the same day as the Fidelity Trust case, the Court held that the lower
federal court must follow a decision of the Cuyahoga County Court of
Appeals of Ohio.2
whether the communication privilege may be invoked in a diversity case should weigh
the federal courts' interest in getting all the pertinent evidence before a federal court
against the state policy aimed at the protection of marriages as buttressed by the federal
policy favoring recogniion of outcome-determinative state rules.
19. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
20. See, e.g., Six Companies v. joint Highway Dist. No. 13, 110 F.2d 620, 626 (9th
Cir.), rev'd, 311 U.S. 180 (1940) ; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Stoner, 109 F.2d 874, 878
(8th Cir.), rev'd, 311 U.S. 464 (1940) ; Field v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 108 F.2d 521,
526 (3d Cir. 1939), rev'd, 311 U.S. 169 (1940); West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 108
F.2d 347, 350 (6th Cir. 1939), rev'd, 311 U.S. 223 (1940).
21. 311 U.S. 169 (1940).
22. Id. at 177.
23. Thatcher v. Trenton Trust Co., 119 N.J.Eq. 408, 182 AtI. 912 (1936) ; Travers
v. Reid, 119 N.J.Eq. 416, 182 Atl. 908 (1936).
24. N.J. Acts, ch. 40, at 59 (1932).
25. 311 U.S. 223 (1940). In the West case, the Court used much the same language
as had been used in the Fidelity Trust case. The Court included within its definition of
state law "rules of decision commonly accepted and acted upon by the bar and inferior
courts which are nevertheless laws of the state although the highest court of the state
has never passed upon them." Id. at 236. Where Chief justice Hughes in Fidelity Trust
speaks of the "more convincing evidence" of state law necessary to overcome the pre-
sumptively binding effect of an intermediate state court decision, justice Stone in West
refers to "other persuasive data" and "all of the available data." Id. at 237. The force
of the West case was weakened somewhat by a collateral estoppel effect created by the
fact that the county court decision cited had been rendered in an almost identical action
between the same parties in a state court and in that case the state's highest court had
refused to review the decision of the county court of appeals.
26. West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 54 Ohio App. 369, 7 N.E.2d 805 (1936). In
this case, the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals had held that a demand upon a cor-
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The Supreme Court in its eagerness to curb the independence of the
federal courts in diversity cases seemed to go too far in the Fidelity Trust
and West cases. First, although in Fidelity Trust the court did not iden-
tify the "more convincing evidence" which would overcome the presump-
tion that an intermediate state court decision correctly states the law of
the state, it is clear from the Court's opinion that the federal court was
not free to reject intermediate state court decisions "merely because it did
not agree with their reasoning."" Yet, the New Jersey vice-chancellors
had ignored the plain words of a state statute.2" Despite the reluctance
of New Jersey's highest court to overrule the chancery court "except for
cogent and important reasons,"2 it seemed more likely than not that, if
and when the question should come before the state's highest court, that
could would find the legislature's intent as embodied in the plain words
of the state statute a sufficiently compelling reason for overruling the
chancery court.2
Although the chancery court involved in the Fidelity Trust case was
a court of statewide jurisdiction, the West case extended the presumption
in favor of intermediate state court decisions to a decision of the Cuya-
hoga County Court of Appeals of Ohio, a court of less than state-wide
jurisdiction, despite the fact that such a decision was of little precedent
value in state courts outside the limited geographical jurisdiction of the
county court. While such a county court decision may reasonably con-
stitute some evidence of what the state law is, it hardly seems reasonable
to presume, as did the Supreme Court in West, that a county court can
formulate and express the law for the entire state. The Supreme Court
recognized as much in a decision handed down eight years after the West
decision."
poration for restitution of stock unlawfully transferred is a prerequisite to the bringing
of a suit against the corporation.
27. 311 U.S. at 179.
28. See note 24 supra.
29. Ramsey v. Hutchinson, 117 N.J.L. 222, 223, 187 Atl. 650, 651 (1936).
30. In fact, the New Jersey Chancery Court subsequently overruled its own deci-
sions and cited with approval the lower federal court opinion in the Fidelity Trust case.
Franklin Washington Trust Co. v. Belthram, 133 N.J.Eq. 11, 29 A.2d 854 (1943) ; Lester
v. Guenther 132 N.J.Eq. 496, 28 A.2d 777 (1942).
31. In King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 333 U.S. 153 (1948), the
Supreme Court ruled that a decision of a South Carolina court, the Court of Common
Pleas for Spartanburg County, was not presumptively binding on a federal court since
the common pleas decision enjoyed no precedent status among the courts of South Caro-
lina and the decisions of that court were not reported and hence were not readily acces-
sible to future litigants in the federal courts. But although the Court refused to create
a presumption that the decision of the South Carolina court of common pleas represented
state law in the absence of "more convincing evidence" of the law of the state, the Court
did not rule out the possibility that the decision of the court of common pleas might
represent a portion of the "more convincing evidence" of which the Court spoke in
Fidelity Trust.
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Sixteen years after the Fidelity Trust and West decisions, the Su-
preme Court handed down a decision in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of
Americca in which the Court, by way of dictum, suggested the type of
evidence which would have allowed a lower federal court to disregard an
old decision of the Supreme Court of Vermont." Justice Douglas, speak-
ing for the Court, wrote:
Were the question in doubt or deserving further canvass, we
would of course remand the case to the Court of Appeals to pass
on this question of Vermont law. But, as we have indicated,
there appears ,to be no confusion in the Vermont decisions, no
developing line of authorities that casts a shadow over the
established ones, no dicta, doubts or ambiguities in the opinions
of the Vermont judges on the question, no legislative develop-
ment that promises to undermine the judicial rule.34
Since the Court was referring in Bernhardt to the considerations
that the Court thought sufficient to rebut the presumption that a decision
of the highest court of the state represented the law of the state, a fortiori
the considerations mentioned by the Court in Bernhardt might rebut the
presumptively binding effect of an intermediate state court decision.
These considerations, then, are necessarily encompassed within the "more
convincing evidence" of state law to which reference was made in Fidelity
Trust." While the earlier Supreme Court cases were primarily aimed at
curbing the independence of federal judges in the face of their often hos-
tile attitude toward Erie,6 the Bernhardt dictum indicated what would
appear to be a relaxation of the requirement that federal courts follow
state court decisions. WVhether rightly or wrongly, the earlier Supreme
Court decisions were often interpreted by the lower federal courts to re-
32. 350 U.S. 198 (1956). This case involved the question of whether the validity
of an arbitration clause in a contract was governed by the United States Arbitration Act
or by state law. The Court concluded that the contract provision in this case was gov-
erned by state law and remanded the case to the United States District Court for the
District of Vermont with directions to determine whether the law of Vermont or the
law of New York was applicable to the arbitration clause.
33. Mead's Adm'x v. Owen, 83 Vt. 132, 74 Atl. 1058 (1910).
34. 350 U.S. at 205.
35. For discussions of this aspect of the Bernhardt case, see 45 CALIF. L. Px-Ev. 87
(1957); 36 TEXAs L. REv. 369 (1958).
36. Various derogatory references were made to the role imposed on federal courts
by Erie. Cooper v. American Airlines, 149 F.2d 355, 357 (2d Cir. 1945) ("divining
rods") ; Zell v. American Seating Co., 138 F.2d 641, 643 (2d Cir. 1943) ("the carefree
days before the advent of Erie v. Tompkins") ; Richardson v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d
562 (2d Cir. 1942), ("ventriloquists' dummies") ; Clark, State Law in the Federal
Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 290-91
(1946) ("wooden sounding boards" and "prostitution").
NOTES
quire a rigid adherence to state court decisions.3 7  While the Bernhardt
dictum did not necessarily indicate that reasoning alone could now over-
come the presumptively binding effect of a state court decision, certainly
the dictum indicated that inferences drawn from other state cases and
legislation might justify disregard of an apparently controlling decision.
II. THE PREDICTION FORMULA OF NOLAN V. TRANSOCEAN AIRLINES
During 1961, in Nolan v. Transocean Airlines,3 the Supreme Court
handed down a decision in which the Court indicated more clearly the
attitude and approach a federal court should adopt when ascertaining
state law. In this diversity of citizenship case, the action was brought in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
by the widow, child, and administrator of a decedent for the death of
the decedent in an airplane crash which occurred in California while de-
cedent was traveling on defendant's airline. A New York "borrowing
statute""3 required the district court to apply the appropriate California
statute of limitations; and the district court did so, accepting the con-
struction placed on the California statute by two California district courts
of appeal." These decisions by intermediate California courts had held
that when the statute of limitations has run as to one beneficiary of a
wrongful death claim, as it had run as to the widow here, the other bene-
ficiaries are also barred because the cause of action is joint. But after
the federal district court had granted summary judgment for the de-
fendant here, the Supreme Court of California in a "considered dictum"
stated that if a joint cause of action is not barred as to one of the parties
because of his infancy, the cause of action is not barred as to the other
parties to the joint action. 1 If the dictum of the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia were followed by the federal district court, the death action would
not be barred as to any of the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court held that
37. "We are bound by it [an intermediate state court decision] until or unless the
Supreme Court of Ohio gave a contrary answer. In these circumstances, it is not for
us to exercise our independent judgment, to look to other jurisdictions, or to speculate as
to what the Supreme Court of Ohio might do." Gettins v. United States Life Ins. Co.,
221 F.2d 782, 785 (6th Cir. 1955). "[W]here state law governs, a federal court may not
decline to accept the rule announced in a state decision merely because it has not received
the express or implied approval of the highest court of the state. This is so even
though the federal court may think it likely that the highest state court will overrule the
intermediate decision at some later date or that another intermediate appellate court will
reach a contrary result." McLouth Steel Corp. v. Mesta Mach. Co., 214 F.2d 608 (3d
Cir. 1954).
38. 365 U.S. 293 (1961).
39. N.Y. CIvIL PRAcTIcE LAW & RULES § 202 (1963).
40. See Haro v. Southern Pac. Co., 17 Cal. App. 2d 594, 62 P.2d 441 (4th Dist. Ct.
of App. 1936) ; Sears v. Majors, 104 Cal. App. 60, 285 Pac. 321 (1st Dist. Ct. of App.
1930).
41. Leeper v. Beltrami, 53 Cal. 2d 195, 208-09, 347 P.2d 12, 22 (1959).
549
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the federal circuit court of appeals must consider the relative weights to
be accorded the decisions of the intermediate California courts and the
dictum of the Supreme Court of California as evidence of the law of that
state. Specifically, the Supreme Court said of the California Supreme
Court dictum:
Inasmuch as the view expressed therein by the highest court of
California may be decisive of an issue critical to petitioner's
claims and inasmuch as the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit is charged with mandatory appellate review in the pres-
ent case, that court should decide what relative weights, as au-
thoritative sources for ascertaining California law, the New
York Court of Appeals would accord to the Sears-Haro line
(direct holdings of California District Courts of Appeal be-
tween 1930 and 1938) and to Leeper (a considered, relevant
dictum of general scope by the California Supreme Court in
1959). We set aside the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
remand to that court for reconsideration of the case in light of
the new factor introduced by Leeper v. Beltrami (Cal.) supra.2
The Nolan case is particularly interesting for two reasons. First, it
provides some additional indication that the Supreme Court feels that a
considered dictum of the highest court of a state may outweigh a direct
holding of an intermediate state court as an authoritative pronouncement
of state law. However, this intimation is somewhat weakened by the
fact that the federal court was directed to ascertain California law sitting
as the New York Court of Appeals rather than as a federal court in a
diversity of citizenship case. 3 Second, and more important, the Nolan
case is exceedingly significant in that, for the first time, the Supreme
Court has equated the ascertainment of state law with a prediction of
what the highest court of a state would decide if the case were before that
court. The federal court of appeals must determine what the New York
Court of Appeals would decide if the case were before the New York
court. The necessary implication of the Nolan decision is that the federal
court must look to those judicial materials which the New York court
would consider in the process of formulating a rule of law, and it must
evaluate those materials much as would the New York court, assigning
such weight to the various materials as the New York court would as-
42. 365 U.S. 293, 295-96 (1961).
43. In fact, on remand of the Nolan case, the court of appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit, in its attempt to deal with the California dictum, examined the practice of the New
York Court of Appeals in dealing with dicta. Nolan v. Transocean Airlines, 290 F.2d
904, 906 (2d Cir. 1961).
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sign them. Evidence of state law is to be found in the very sources
from which the highest court of the state would draw in formulating
state law, and the significance of each source is to be found by adopting
the judicial attitude and approach of the state court.
The pre-Nolan, Supreme Court cases did not specifically deal with
the attitude and general approach that a federal court should adopt in its
task of ascertaining state law. The early cases were primarily concerned
with forcing federal courts to consider sources of state law other than
merely decisions of the highest court of the state; more specifically, they
created a presumption that certain intermediate state court decisions are
authoritative pronouncements of state law. While these cases spoke of
ill-defined "convincing evidence" of state law, they offered no criteria
by which to identify and evaluate the sources from which this evidence
might be drawn. While the Bernhardt dictum identified some of the
possible sources of state law on which a federal court might draw, the
dictum did not expressly state how a federal court should determine the
respective weights to be assigned these sources.
The specific rules laid down by the pre-Bernhardt Supreme Court
cases do not stand up well when they are tested by the requirement that
they lead to an outcome in the federal court which is as nearly as possible
identical to the outcome that would result if the case were before a state
court. The losing party in a federal court in which the presumption in
favor of an intermediate state court decision had been invoked would have
no way to contest the adverse decision despite the very real possibility
that in the state court system he could have appealed to the highest court
of the state and obtained a repudiation of the intermediate state court
rule. 4 Similarly, a litigant in the federal courts could be bound by an
antiquated decision of the highest court of the state despite the very real
possibility that the state court would now overrule the case.45
Much of the difficulty in the early cases is attributable to a lack of
recognition of the real role of a United States district court in a diversity
of citizenship case. The cases have referred to a federal court sitting in
a diversity case as simply "another court of the State."4  But this refer-
ence raises the question, which court of the state: a state trial court, an
intermediate state court, the highest court of the state? The presump-
ively binding effect given intermediate state court decisions in the Fidel-
ity Trust and West cases by the Supreme Court seems to be the result of
44. See the student material cited in note 35 supra.
45. For discussions of the problem presented by the antiquated state decision, see
43 B.U.L. Rv. 409 (1963); 5 WAYNE L. REV. 351 (1959); 106 U. PA. L. Rav. 924(1958).
46. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945).
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the Court's viewing intermediate state court decisions from the viewpoint
of a state trial court rather than from the vantage point of the highest
court of the state. The Nolanz case, however, corrects this view and
answers that a federal district court in a diversity case is acting as a sub-
stitute for the entire state court system; it must exercise the special func-
tions assigned to each level within the hierarchy of state courts. The
federal court is substituting not only for the state trial court as the trier
of fact but also for the highest court of the state in its task of formulating
state law and applying it to the facts found. This accordian-like com-
pression of the state court system into a single federal court necessarily
means that some intermediate functions of the state court system become
unnecessary. A federal court need not formulate and apply state law as
would a state trial court or intermediate state court since the federal
court's function as a substitute for the highest court of the state where
questions of state law are concerned necessarily controls its functions as
a subordinate state court in this respect. No doubt, the orderly adminis-
tration of justice within a hierarchical state court system requires that
state trial courts defer to precedents of superior intermediate courts
despite the fact that the state's highest court need not respect them. But
the way in which the state distributes its judicial functions for conveni-
ence of administration is of no concern to a federal court seeking to per-
form all of the functions of the state court system. The role of a federal
court as a substitute for the state trial court, insofar as that implies a
deference to intermediate state court decisions, is eclipsed by its role as
a substitute for the highest court of the state when questions of state
law arise.
Speaking of the federal court in a diversity case as a substitute for
a unitary state court system may seem to fly in the face of certain lan-
guage in the Byrd opinion to the effect that a federal court sitting in a
diversity case is nonetheless part of an independent system of federal
courts with policy interests that may not always coincide with state in-
terests.47 But as previously discussed, the Byrd doctrine applies only in
the exceptional circumstances where a state rule that could make some
substantial difference in the outcome of the case is opposed by a strong
federal policy. The Byrd doctrine adequately protects federal interests
47. "The federal system is an independent system for administering justice to
litigants who properly invoke its jurisdiction. An essential characteristic of that system
is the manner in which, in civil common law actions, it distributes trial functions between
judge and jury and, under the influence-if not the command-of the Seventh Amend-
ment, assigns the decisions of disputed questions of fact to the jury." Byrd v. Blue
Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958).
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by precluding the application of certain state rules after they have been
ascertained with reference to their effect on the outcome of the case.
The prediction formula endorsed by the Supreme Court in Nolan
enables a federal court to ascertain that state law which if applied by the
federal court would result in an outcome in the federal court substantially
identical to the outcome that would have resulted in the state court sys-
tem. By appealing to the highest court of the state, a litigant in the state
court system gains the advantage of a formulation of state law by the
highest court of the state; and correspondingly, under the prediction
formula, a federal court ascertains that state law which the highest court
of the state would apply were the case before that state court.48 In order
to predict what the highest court of a state would declare to be its law, the
federal court should strive to duplicate, as nearly as possible, the judicial
method of the state court. The federal court should seek out and ex-
amine those judicial materials which the state court would consider in
arriving at a decision. Of course, this means that a federal court must
consider not only controlling decisions of the state's highest court but
also previous decisions of the state court that would shed light on the
whole area of state law in which the contested issue lies. To the extent
that the state court would recognize its own considered dicta in arriving
at a decision, the federal court should also recognize considered dicta of
the state's highest court. If the state court would refuse to overturn an
intermediate state court precedent except for "cogent and important rea-
sons," the federal court should also refuse to do so except for "cogent
and important reasons.""9  If the state court would give consideration to
state legislative policy embodied in state statutes in related or analogous
areas of law, a federal court should also recognize this legislative policy.
If, when the state court turned to extra-state sources of law, it custom-
arily relied heavily on the law of a particular sister state or on a restate-
ment of law, the federal court should also rely heavily on these sources
48. Of course, the Nolan formula assumes that the parties in the federal court, if
they had brought their action instead in a state court, would have appealed an adverse
decision to the highest court of the state. If, for example, the parties in a state court
would have acquiesced in the application of a questionable intermediate state court
precedent, the Nolan prediction formula might lead to an outcome in the federal court
differing from that which would have resulted in the state court system. But such a
result in the state court system is not a virtue of that system. The losing party in the
intermediate state appellate court may find it too expensive to prosecute his appeal to the
state's highest court, or he may not even have the funds necessary to appeal. Such a
result represents merely an undesirable but unavoidable peculiarity of a system in whichjudicial functions are, for purposes of administrative convenience, divided between dif-
ferent levels of courts in a hierarchical system. There is no reason why federal courts
should eliminate the hierarchy but retain its undesirable characteristics.
49. See note 29 supra.
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of law.Y
A federal court, under the Nolan formula should not only rely on the
same judicial materials as would the state's highest court, but the federal
court should also adopt the state court's attitude and approach to judicial
decision-making. If a survey of the state court's decisions discloses a
readiness to overrule antiquated decisions that are out of step with the
modern majority rule, the federal court should be just as ready to dis-
regard such decisions. If the cases reveal that certain policy considera-
tions created by the state court customarily influence the state court in its
decision-making process, then the federal court must also take into ac-
count the effect of these policies on the case at hand. In short, the fed-
eral court should think like it thinks the state court would think.
Evidence of the state court's judicial attitude and approach should
be drawn from previous direct holdings and considered dicta of the state
court, not only because the state court would itself look to these judicial
materials but also because they represent good evidence of the judicial
attitude of the state court in its approach to judicial decision-making. It
is not contended that a federal court should seek personal knowledge of
the personal attitudes and opinions of the individual judges comprising
the state's highest court or that a federal court should take into account
special quirks of individual state judges. Opinions and idosyncrasies of
individual state judges cannot be compared reasonably with the considered
opinion of the entire state court deciding a hotly-contested case in an
adversary proceeding. The attitude and approach of a state court to-
ward the judicial process should be drawn only from formal opinions
of the state's highest court handed down in actual cases. Admittedly, any
attempt to adopt as nearly as possible the attitude and approach of the
highest court of the state will result in "estimates" where the highest
court has not spoken on the contested issue; but as Justice Frankfurter
wrote in his concurring opinion in BernhJardt, "So long as there is diver-
sity jurisdiction, 'estimates' are necessarily often all that federal courts
can make in ascertaining what the state court would rule to be its law."'
'r
At this point, it is useful to note that the Nolan case reached the Su-
preme Court only because the court of appeals had declined to consider
the significance of a state court dictum that had been uttered after the
district court's summary judgment. Only rarely will such a case dealing
with the general approach to the ascertainment of state law actually reach
50. See, e.g., Stentor v. Klaxon, 125 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S.
685 (1942), in which the federal court took note of the Delaware courts' practice of rely-
ing on texts and restatements, particularly the RESTATEMENT OF CONFLIcT OF LAWs, be-
fore the federal court itself applied law from these sources.
51. 350 U.S. 198, 209 (1956).
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the Supreme Court since it is often very difficult to determine what gen-
eral approach the lower federal court has adopted in a given case, and
even if that be determined, it is normally difficult to show that adoption
of the wrong approach was prejudicial to the appellant. This suggests
that the lower federal courts should not only recognize the Nolan case for
its precedent value but should also bear closely in mind the great diffi-
culty involved in obtaining appellate court review of a lower court deci-
sion in which an improper general approach to the ascertainment of state
law has been utilized.
III. THE PERFORMANCE OF THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS IN
ASCERTAINING STATE LAW
WX hile the Nolan prediction formula suggests definite standards
which lower federal courts should adopt in their quest for state law, the
Supreme Court cases decided during the twenty-three years before Nolan
gave the lower federal courts little help in formulating a general ap-
proach to the ascertainment of state law. Therefore it is not to be ex-
pected that these courts on their own initiative would have adopted a uni-
form approach to the ascertainment of state law conforming to the pre-
diction formula suggested by Nolan. Nevertheless, neither courts nor
commentators have turned to the Nolan case as a solution to the problem
in the years following the decision. In fact, the lower federal courts
seem to have adopted three general approaches to the problem. Some
courts have exercised an entirely independent judgment whenever feas-
ible; other courts have chosen to exercise an independent judgment in
light of intra-state evidence of the law of the state; still other courts have
used the Nolan approach and have attempted to predict what the highest
court of the state would rule.
The first approach adopted by the lower federal courts-the "en-
tirely independent approach"-is a holdover from pre-Erie days. Under
this approach, if there is no controlling state court decision" or if an ap-
parently controlling state court decision can be distinguished on fact53 or
principle" or if counsel have not briefed the local law, 5 the federal court
52. See, e.g., Nello L. Teer Co. v. Hollywood Golf Estates, Inc., 324 F.2d 669 (5th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 909 (1964) ; Doetsch v. Doetsch, 312 F.2d 323 (7th Cir.
1963); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 299 F.2d 215 (7th
Cir. 1962); Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. J.A.
Jones Constr. Co., 200 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Ark. 1961).
53. See, e.g., Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 297 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1962); Paddle-
ford v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 100 F.2d 606 (7th Cir. 1938).
54. See, e.g., Bloomfield Village Drain Dist. v. Keefe, 119 F.2d 157 (6th Cir. 1941),
cert. denied, 315 U.S. 830 (1942).
55. See, e.g., Jamison Coal & Coke Co. v. Goltra, 143 F.2d 889 (8th Cir. 1944);
Skinner Mfg. Co. v. Kellog Sales Co., 143 F.2d 895 (8th Cir. 1944); Mishawaka Rub-
ber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge, 119 F.2d 316 (6th Cir. 1941).
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exercises an independent judgment. The early Seventh Circuit case of
Daily v. Parker"6 is typical of those cases in which the federal courts have
exercised an independent judgment. In that case, the circuit court of ap-
peals created a previously non-existent cause of action whereby the plain-
tiff children of a man who had been enticed away from his family by the
feminine defendant might recover from the defendant for loss of the
maintenance and support that their father would otherwise have pro-
vided. Since the action was brought in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, it was incumbent upon the circuit
court of appeals to apply the law of Illinois. After acknowledging that
there was no precedent either in the Illinois courts or in the courts of any
other state for such a cause of action as that urged by plaintiffs, the
court said, "If the state courts have not acted, we are free to take the
course which sound judgment demands."5  The court went on to con-
sider the general rights and duties inherent in the family relationship.
Nowhere did the court mention policies or principles drawn from the
domestic relations law of the state of Illinois.
In subsequent cases, the courts of the Seventh Circuit have often
exercised an entirely independent judgment when they have found the
state law vague or disagreeable. In one such case, 8 the court of appeals
distinguished on the facts an Indiana case 9 which had held that title to
stolen money does not pass to an innocent party who received it from the
thief in satisfaction of the thief's debt. The federal court distinguished
the earlier Indiana case, and applied the contrary majority rule, on the
ground that in the Indiana case the stolen money had been paid to the in-
nocent third party in satisfaction of an antecedent debt of the thief while
in the instant case the stolen money had been used to purchase mer-
chandise from the innocent third party. On the other hand, the Indiana
case did not make much of this point but concentrated instead on the fact
that the thief did not have title to the money. The court of appeals made
no attempt to examine the policy or reasoning behind the Indiana case to
determine whether the policy manifested in the Indiana case was applic-
able to the case at hand. In other Seventh Circuit cases, the courts have
been very ready to find a lack of pertinent state authorities and to turn
to general authorities. 0 In one such case61 originating in Indiana, the
56. 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945).
57. Id. at 177.
58. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 297 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1962).
59. Porter v. Roseman, 165 Ind. 255, 74 N.E. 1105 (1905).
60. See, e.g., Doetsch v. Doetsch, 312 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1963) ; Wigginton v. Order
of United Commercial Travelers of America, 126 F.2d 659 (7th Cir. 1942).
61. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 299 F.2d 215 (7th
Cir. 1962).
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court of appeals relied on one of its previous decisions" which was in
point but which had been handed down in a case originating in Illinois.
In the prior Illinois case the court had explored the conflicting general
authorities in arriving at a decision, but in the instant Indiana case the
court did not consider the possibility that its duty to apply Indiana law
rather than Illinois law might make some difference in its evaluation of
the general authorities. After all, it was exercising an entirely independ-
ent judgment in both cases.
Another general approach to the ascertainment of state law which
the lower federal courts have utilized is the exercise of an independent
judgment based on all the available intra-state evidence of state law."3
Although under the "intra-state evidence" approach the federal court
scrutinizes and takes cognizance of principles of state law drawn from all
of the available intra-state sources, the federal court independently evalu-
ates the judicial material examined according to the court's own predilec-
tions, assigning such weights to the various sources as the federal court
feels proper. The Bernhardt dictum in which the Supreme Court enum-
erated some of the possible intra-state sources of state law might suggest
this approach since the Court did not indicate how materials from the
various sources were to be evaluated. The intra-state evidence approach,
however, is a "has been" approach to the ascertainment of state law. The
court is more concerned with arriving at a rule of law which is consistent
with previous authoritative expressions of state law than in trying to de-
termine what the state law would be if a state court were presently to
pass on the question. 4 A good statement of the intra-state evidence
approach to the ascertainment of state law may be found in New England
111'ut. Life v. Mitchell :65
We are not required to speculate as to how the state court
might decide the question before us if it has not already decided
it. . . . The respectful attitude towards the local court, where
there has been no decision on the precise question before us, is
to consider that question in the light of the common law of the
state, with a view of reaching the decision which reason dictates,
62. Michigan Mut. Liab. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 297 F.2d 208 (7th Cir. 1961).
63. See, e.g., Mfazzi v. Greenlee Tool Co., 320 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1963) ; Baldwin v.
Hill, 315 F.2d 821 (6th Cir. 1963); Hartness v. Aldens, Inc., 301 F.2d 228 (7th Cir.
1962); Green v. Robertshaw-Fulton Controls Co., 204 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Ind. 1962);
Walrus Mfg. Co. v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 184 F. Supp. 214 (S.D. Ill. 1960).
64. "The Michigan Supreme Court has not yet ruled upon the question presented
for decision. We are satisfied, however, that our decision here will not be inconsistent
with Michigan cases which have construed its guest-passenger statute." Baldwin v. Hill,
315 F.2d 737, 741 (6th Cir. 1963).
65. 118 F.2d 414 (4th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 629 (1942).
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and with the faith that the local court will reach the same deci-
sion when the question comes before it.66
In a number of Seventh Circuit cases the federal courts have exer-
cised an independent judgment "in the light of judicial construction of
courts that have passed on the question."6  For example, in Hartness v.
Aldens, Inc.,"8 the court of appeals, after examining the Illinois authori-
ties and ruling that Illinois would not recognize a South Carolina survival
statute said, "We think there is a basic opposition between the South
Carolina survival statute and the Illinois policy as expressed by the Illi-
nois courts."6  The emphasis was on what "we think" based on Illinois
authorities rather than on what the Illinois court would decide if the case
were before the Illinois court. Similarly, in construing an Indiana statute
allowing service of process on foreign corporations, the District Court
for the Southern District of Indiana analyzed Indiana case law, statutes,
and attorney general opinions to conclude that Indiana had not adopted
a narrow interpretation of "doing business" in the state. The court then
went on to exercise an independent judgment in concluding that the
language of the Indiana statute was broad enough to cover the particular
facts of the case before the court.7" Typically these cases speak in terms
of what the state courts have or have not done rather than in terms of
what a state court would do if the case were presently before it."'
As must be apparent by now, the recent lower federal court cases
cited in the preceding discussion show that some federal courts, particu-
larly Seventh Circuit courts, are still holding to the two independent judg-
ment approaches even though the Supreme Court tacitly rejected these
approaches in the Nolan case. The foregoing discussion also suggests
that the same court may at one time adopt an entirely independent ap-
proach and at another time adopt an approach utilizing an independent
judgment exercised in light of the available intra-state evidence of state
law. If the light is bright, the court cannot ignore it; but if the light is
dim, it is easier to ignore it and turn to the more easily ascertainable
general authorities. However, it seems that no matter how vague the
state authority, there should be some all-pervasive state policies or prin-
66. Id. at 420.
67. Walrus Mfg. Co. v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 184 F. Supp. 214 (S.D. Ill.
1960).
68. 301 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1962).
69. Id. at 229.
70. Green v. Robertshaw-Fulton Controls Co., 204 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Ind. 1962).
71. ". . . Indiana has not adopted a narrow interpretation. . . ." Id. at 137.
. Indiana has not expanded the measure of damages . . ." Vera Cruz v. Chesa-
peake & 0. R.R., 192 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. Ind. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 312 F.2d
330 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 813 (1963).
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ciples which could guide the federal court in the decision-making process.
Applicable state policies and principles could be drawn from legislation
and case law in the same general area of law as the case before the federal
court or in analogous areas of law. Even those state cases which some
federal courts feel compelled to distinguish should nonetheless reveal
something about the state judicial attitude toward the issue before the
federal court. As one federal judge observed, "[I]t does not seem to me
that it could ever be said that a state has no law upon any given question
merely because the precise question has not yet been passed upon by any
court.
7 -2
The third general approach the federal courts have taken in their
task of ascertaining state law consists of a prediction of what the highest
court of the state would decide were the case before that high court.78 It
was the line of cases taking this general approach which the Supreme
Court endorsed in the Nolan case. Under this approach, the federal
court must forego an independent judgment and adopt instead the judi-
cial method of the state court. Some courts accepted the prediction ap-
proach not long after the Erie decision. 74  Typical of the language used
by these courts is a comment from Cooper v. American Airlines : "This
case is in that zone in which the federal courts must do their best to
guess what the highest state court will do."'7
It is interesting to note that in some Seventh Circuit cases in which
the courts have exercised an independent judgment they have dressed up
their opinions in prediction language. In one case77 involving the liability
of a manufacturer for damages allegedly caused by a defect in its product,
the court, after showing that there were no state cases in point, said,
"[W]e feel justified in concluding that the Supreme Court of Iowa
would adopt the modem rule. 78 However, no reason was given for
such a conclusion other than that it was the modern rule. The court did
not discuss any predilection of the Iowa court for adopting modern
rules where state authority is lacking. In another case, 9 the federal court
72. Simmons v. Simmons, 41 F. Supp. 545, 547 (E.D.S.C. 1941).
73. See, e.g., Lowe's North Wilkesboro Hardware, Inc. v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 319 F.2d 469 (4th Cir. 1963) ; Weisser v. Otter Tail Power Co., 318 F.2d 375 (8th
Cir. 1963) ; Leport v. White River Barge Line, 315 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1963) ; Tavernier
v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 309 F.2d 87 (9th Cir. 1962).
74. See, e.g., Glasscock v. Farmers Royalty Holding Co., 152 F.2d 537 (5th Cir.
1945); Jackman v. Equitable Life, 145 F.2d 945 (3d Cir. 1944) ; Gum v. Gumakers of
America, 136 F.2d 957 (3d Cir. 1943); Yoder v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 117 F.2d 488 (8th
Cir. 1941).
75. 149 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1945).
76. Id. at 359.
77. Anderson v. Linton, 178 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1949).
78. Id. at 309.
79. Rekeweg v. Federal Mut. Ins. Co., 27 F.R.D. 431 (N.D. Ind. 1961).
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said, "[T]his court is free to hold as it believes Indiana would hold . . .
[and] . . . ,hereby adopts the rationale and holding of the New York
cases . . ., " but the court gave no reason for its belief that Indiana
would so hold except that the New York rule was the "better rule."'"
Similarly, in Doetsch. v. Doetsh,2 the federal court asserted Illinois
would adopt a particular rule because it was, in the opinion of the federal
court, "the better rule."8"
The three general approaches adopted by the lower federal courts di-
verge most in those cases where state law is neither clear nor totally ob-
scure. It is obvious that if there is a recent decision of the state's highest
court in point, the federal court court must follow it regardless of whether
it has adopted an entirely independent approach, an intrastate evidence
approach, or a prediction approach. If there is no case in point but there
is nonetheless some state law in the same general area as the disputed
issue, a court taking an entirely independent approach would ignore the
state authority. However, a court adopting an intra-state evidence ap-
proach would base its judgment on all the available intra-state authori-
ties, in which case its formulation of state law might approximate the
result to which a prediction approach would lead. The primary differ-
ence here is that the prediction approach is directed toward a formulation
of state law as it would be if the highest state court were now to pass on
the question rather than toward a formulation of state law which is mere-
ly consistent with previous authoritative expressions of state law. That
is, the difference is in the methodology by which the state sources are
utilized. If state authority is lacking or totally inadequate, a federal
court may find it necessary to resort to the same general authorities re-
gardless of which of the three general approaches it adopts. Nonetheless,
the prediction approach will still differ from the other two approaches in
that a court adopting the prediction approach must adopt the judicial
method of the highest court of the state whereas the courts adopting
either of the two independent judgment approaches need not consider this
sometimes elusive factor.
Thus far, it has been shown that the lower federal courts have dif-
fered greatly in their general approaches to the ascertainment problem,
but the analysis would not be complete without an examination of the
treatment they have given specific sources of state law, such as decisions
and dicta of various levels of state courts, opinions of state attorneys gen-
80. Id. at 436.
81. Ibid.
82. 312 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1963).
83. Id. at 328.
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eral, and unanimity of decision among state trial courts. Generally, the
treatment given specific sources of state law in any particular case has
depended on a combination of factors which include the general approach
to the ascertainment problem that the federal court has adopted, the
court's own estimation of the worth of the material examined, and the
force the court gives to specific presumptions created by the Supreme
Court. For example, a lower federal court might take an entirely inde-
pendent approach and ignore pertinent dicta of the highest court of a
state; or the same federal court might exercise an intra-state evidence
approach and take the state court dicta into account but give it more or
less weight in the judicial process than would another federal court adopt-
ing the same general approach. Similarly, a court adopting any one of
the three general approaches may require more or less convincing evi-
dence of state law to overcome the presumption favoring state court de-
cisions than would another federal court adopting the same general ap-
proach. The general approach adopted by a federal court then may be
only one of the factors involved in the way in which a particular federal
court utilizes a specific source of state law in a given case. Therefore, it
is pertinent to inquire how these sources are presently used, and how
they should be used under the Nolan formula.
Generally, the lower federal courts have treated decisions of the
highest court of the state with deference."4 A recent holding of the high-
est court of the state is, of course, the best evidence of how a state court
would presently rule on the same issue; and consequently, a federal court
has little difficulty in applying the same rule to the issue before it. On
the other hand, an antiquated decision of the highest court of the state-
for example, a decision handed down fifty years earlier which is contrary
to the modern rule in the majority of jurisdictions-represents relatively
poorer evidence of how the same issue would be decided if it were pres-
ently before a state court.3 5 Nevertheless, some federal courts have re-
fused to consider the possibility of disregarding an antiquated decision. 6
Other courts have been more willing to examine the antiquated case in
84. But see cases cited notes 53, 54 supra.
85. See the student material cited in note 45 supra.
86. "We believe the more meaningful approach is to determine what the Massa-
chusetts court has done . . . rather than what it said in an earlier day it might do."
Waltham Precision Instrument Co. v. McDonnell Aircraft Corp., 310 F.2d 20, 23 (1st
Cir. 1962). "We are not authorized to act as a reviewing court for the purpose of de-
termining whether the ruling of the state court of last resort is sound." Branch v. United
States Fid. & Guar. Co., 198 F2d 1007, 1011 (6th Cir. 1952). "[T]he duty of United
States courts in such cases is to ascertain, construe, and apply static state law: not to
limit, modify, or repeal state doctrine." Rehm v. Interstate Motor Freight Sys., 133 F.2d
154, 157 (6th Cir. 1943).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
the light of the modern trend both within and without the state."s
An interesting example of a case in which a federal court has found
convincing evidence that an antiquated decision of a state's highest court
was not the law of the state is the Seventh Circuit case of Elliott v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp.8 In that case, the court held that Indiana had adopted
the products liability rule first set out by Justice Cardozo in McPherson v.
Buick Motor Co.89 Despite a contrary Indiana Supreme Court decision"0
handed down forty-two years earlier, the court of appeals noted that the
MacPherson case had been approved by the appellate court of Indiana in
two subsequent cases.91 In each of these appellate court cases a petition
to transfer had been denied by the Indiana Supreme Court. "The effect
thereof is that the conclusions reached by the Appellate Court were ap-
proved by the Supreme Court." 2
In the utilization of decisions of intermediate state courts for pur-
poses of ascertaining state law, the federal courts have of course heeded
the presumption created by the Supreme Court that these decisions are
binding pronouncements of state law in the absence of "more convincing
evidence" of the law of the state. In fact, after the Fidelity Trust and
West cases, many federal courts giving binding effect to intermediate
state court decisions practically ignored the fact that "more convincing
evidence" of the law of the state should vitiate the presumptively binding
effect of such decisions. 3 The big problem was the absence of any defi-
nition of this "more convincing evidence" which would overcome the
presumption. 4
87. "Where a state's interpretation of a service of process statute has moved for-
ward in keeping with the relaxation of earlier declarations of constitutional restraint
upon her powers, there is no place for hesitancy to assume that it will continue to do so."
Shealy v. Challenger Mfg. Co., 304 F.2d 102 (4th Cir. 1962). Accord, Mason v. Ameri-
can Emery Wheel Works, 241 F.2d 906 (1st Cir. 1957).
88. 296 F.2d 125 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 860 (1962).
89. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
90. Travis v. Rochester Bridge Co., 188 Ind. 79, 122 N.E. 1 (1919).
91. Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Williams, 111 Ind. App. 502, 37 N.E.2d 702
(1941) ; Holland Furnace Co. v. Nauracaj, 105 Ind. App. 574, 14 N.E.2d 339 (1938).
92. 296 F.2d at 128.
93. "We are bound by it [an intermediate state court decision] until or unless the
Supreme Court of Ohio gives a contrary answer. In these circumstances, it is not for us
to exercise our independent judgment, to look to other jurisdictions, or to speculate as to
what the Supreme Court of Ohio might do." Gettins v. United States Life Ins. Co., 221
F.2d 782, 785 (6th Cir. 1955). "[W]here state law governs, a federal court may not de-
cline to accept the rule announced in a state decision merely because it has not received
the express or implied approval of the highest court of the state. This is so even though
the federal court may think it likely that the highest state court will overrule the inter-
mediate decision at some later date or that another intermediate appellate court will reach
a contrary result." McLouth Steel Corp. v. Mesta Mach. Co., 214 F.2d 608 (3d Cir. 1954).
94. For an example of a case in which a federal court found "more convincing evi-
dence" of state law in a general policy revealed by a survey of cases decided by the
state's highest court, see Sullivan v. Shell Oil Co., 234 F.2d 733 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
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The federal courts are split as to the recognition which should be
given to dicta of state courts. Some federal courts have simply refused
to recognize dicta of the highest court of the state or have given it little
weight as authoritative evidence of state law,9" while some federal courts
have felt themselves bound by such dicta.96 Other federal courts have
recognized that dicta of the highest court of the state, though it is not
binding on a federal court, may be persuasive evidence of how the high-
est court of a state would decide an issue.97 Fortunately, such cases make
a sensible distinction between considered dicta and obiter dicta, giving
little weight to the latter.9"
In the absence of controlling state court precedents or persuasive
dicta concerning the issue in dispute, some courts have turned immediately
to the general authorities.99 Other courts utilize whatever other sources
352 U.S. 925, 25 GEo. WASH. L. Ray. 367 (1956). In this case, the federal district court
had considered itself bound by Nagle v. City of Long Beach, 113 Cal. App. 2d 669, 248
P.2d 799 (2d Dist. Ct. of App. 1952), in which an employee of a contractor engaged in
repairing a gas tank was, as a matter of law, not allowed to recover from the owner-
occupier of the land because the employee had been engaged to remedy the very in-
strumentality which contributed to his injuries. The court of appeals in refusing to fol-
low the Nagle case said: "The California Supreme Court cases . . . are persuasive as
to the view of the Supreme Court that these owner-occupier cases generally present ques-
tions of fact." 234 F.2d at 741. "We think there is persuasive evidence the California
Supreme Court will not adopt the rule of the Nagle case. We do not find the 'construc-
tion project' cases or the Nagle case even cited by the California Supreme Court." 234
F.2d at 742.
95. In one case, a federal court took note of dicta of the state's highest court to
the effect that a state "doing business" statute would be construed to its constitutional
limits but said, 'Whether this be so or not we think it is no business for a federal court
to meddle in." Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co., 170 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1948). In
another case, the federal court insisted that it was under no obligation to follow dicta
of the state's highest court. Powell v. Maryland Trust Co., 125 F.2d 260 (4th Cir. 1942).
Another federal court dismissed dicta of the state's highest court and instead applied the
"modern rule." Anderson v. Linton, 178 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1949).
96. "However, even if the defendant was correct in referring to that part of the
John's opinion as dictum, it is nonetheless binding on this Court under the Erie Doctrine."
Doucet v. Middleton, 328 F.2d 97, 101 (5th Cir. 1964). "The excerpt in question is a
clear and unequivocal exposition of the law and has at least the standing of dictum. Un-
less it conflicts with other decisions of the Kansas Supreme Court, it must be followed."
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Cassel, 302 F.2d 132, 135 (10th Cir. 1962).
97. "Moreover, in a case in which jurisdiction rests upon diversity, this court will
ordinarily follow well-considered dictum of the highest court of the state if it appears to
be a clear and unequivocal exposition of law and is not at variance with other decisions
of the court." Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 287 F.2d
69, 73 (10th Cir. 1961). In another case, the federal court held that a recent dictum of
the state's highest court was persuasive enough to overcome an antiquated decision of
that court. Mason v. American Emery Works, 241 F.2d 906 (1st Cir. 1957). Of course,
the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that dicta may 'be persuasive evidence of
of how the highest court of a state would decide an issue. Nolan v. Transocean Air-
lines, 365 U.S. 293 (1961).
98. Doucet v. Middleton, 328 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1964) ; Noel v. Olds, 138 F.2d 581
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 773 (1943); Bank of Cal. v. American Fruit Growers,
41 F. Supp. 967 (E.D. Wash. 1941).
99. See cases cited note 56 supra.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
are available as authoritative evidence of state law. These courts con-
sider state policies and principles drawn from other state cases or statutes
in analogous areas of the law."'0 They have drawn on such diverse ma-
terials as opinions of state attorneys general,' notes of the committee
which drafted statutory materials,"0 2 unreported decisions of state inter-
mediate appellate courts,0 3 and unanimity of decision among state trial
courts.'0 4
The attitude of those federal courts which treat the presumption in
favor of intermediate state court decisions as binding or which refuse to
re-examine an antiquated decision of the highest court of the state is
much the same as that of courts taking an entirely independent approach.
This approach is black and white. If a controlling state court decision can-
not be distinguished, it must be followed regardless of other persuasive
evidence that it does not represent the law of the state; if the state deci-
sion can be distinguished, the federal court is free to make an independent
judgment. The court need not refer to other persuasive intra-state evi-
dence of state law. The position of a court which will draw on all of the
available sources of state law, either in the absence of a controlling state
court decision or when there exists an apparently controlling intermediate
state court decision or antiquated decision of the state's highest court, cor-
responds closely to both the position taken by a court which adopts the
prediction approach and a court which adopts an intra-state evidence ap-
proach. The intra-state evidence court will draw on state court decisions,
dicta, state policies and principles, opinions of the state bar, local practice,
state administrative rulings, unanimity of decision among state trial
courts, and other sources of state law; but since the court has recognized
no criteria by which to evaluate this material, it will evaluate independ-
ently the material in accordance with its own judicial method, assigning
such weights to the various materials as it feels proper. On the other
hand, a court which has adopted the prediction approach, while it will
examine materials drawn from the same sources, will evaluate those ma-
terials by utilizing the judicial method of the highest court of the state,
100. Hartness v. Aldens, Inc., 301 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1962) (policy) ; Spurgeon v.
Mission State Bank, 151 F.2d 702 (8th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 782 (1946)
(principle) ; In re American Fuel & Power, 151 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
327 U.S. 774 (1946) (historical study) ; Kataoka v. May Dep't Store, 115 F.2d 521 (9th
Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 700 (1941) (philosophy).
101. Bostick v. Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp., 154 F. Supp. 744 (D.C. Md. 1957),
rev'd on other grounds, 260 F.2d 534 (4th Cir. 1958).
102. Neff v. Hindman, 77 F. Supp. 4 (W.D. Penn. 1948).
103. Gustin v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 154 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1946).
104. California Dep't of Employment v. Fred S. Renauld & Co., 179 F.2d 605 (9th
Cir. 1950); Masse v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 163 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Penn.
1958) ; Neff v. Hindman, 77 F. Supp. 4 (W.D. Penn. 1948).
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assigning such weights to the materials examined as would the state's
highest court.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it may be said that the rationale on which Erie is
grounded requires a federal court sitting in a diversity case to ascertain
that state law which if applied by the federal court would result in an
outcome in the federal court as nearly as possible identical to the outcome
which would have resulted had the litigant brought his action in the state
court system. The approach approved by the Supreme Court in the Nolan
case whereby a federal court attempts to predict how the highest court of
a state would presently decide the issue in question is the approach most
likely to result in ascertainment of the pertinent body of outcome-
determinative state law. It is recognized, of course, that the Byrd doc-
trine may preclude the application of a particular state rule after the body
of pertinent outcome-determinative state law has been ascertained where
supervening federal interests dictate a contrary rule.
Under the Nolan prediction formula, the federal court should at-
tempt to duplicate the judicial method of the highest court of the state.
The federal court should look to those judicial materials which the state
court would consider in the process of formulating a rule of law, and it
should evaluate those materials much as would the state court, assigning
such weight to the various materials as the state court would assign them.
Evidence of state law is to be found in the very sources from which the
highest court of the state would draw in formulating state law, and the
significance of each source is to be found by adopting the judicial atti-
tude and approach of the state court.
In contrast to the Nolan standard, the courts of the Seventh Circuit
have often utilized the other two approaches to the ascertainment of state
law. In many cases, they have taken the intra-state evidence approach
and have conceded only that they must arrive at decisions which are con-
sistent with readily ascertainable evidence of static state law. In other
cases, if the state law is sufficiently vague or the results of applying static
state law would be otherwise undesirable, they have taken the entirely in-
dependent approach and have ignored or distinguished existing state
authority. They often express the opinion, or the hope, that, if and
when the same issue should come before a state court, the state court
would apply the same rule of law as that applied by the federal court; but
they base their hope on their confidence in the independent reasoning of
the federal court. In such cases, they do not attempt to examine and
utilize the judicial method of the highest court of the state. The ap-
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proach often taken by the Seventh Circuit courts, then, is not at all con-
sistent with the approach endorsed by the Supreme Court in the Nolan
case.
Consequently diversity decisions of the courts of the Seventh Cir-
cuit, may suffer to some extent from the very maladies Erie and subse-
quent Supreme Court decisions were designed to cure. First, to the extent
there is an element of independent judgment involved in the federal
court's formulation of applicable state law, litigants in a diversity case are
getting a type of pre-Erie general law which may not correspond to the
law litigants would obtain were they in a state court. Second, and per-
haps more basic, a federal court exercising a type of independent judg-
ment can effectively frustrate valid state policies manifested in state court
definitions of state-created rights and obligations. By independently de-
fining a state-created right or obligation, the federal court can alter the
state policy embodied in the right or obligation. On the other hand, the
Nolan prediction formula, if followed by the federal courts, would not
only minimize the inequities of forum-shopping but also force federal
recognition and respect for valid state policies. It is, of course, the thesis
of this note that the lower federal courts should adopt the prediction
formula of the Nolan case not only because it was specifically endorsed
by the Supreme Court but also because it best effectuates the basic policies
underlying the Erie decision.
THE EFFECT OF DIVERSITY JURISDICTION ON
STATE LITIGATION
Before the Constitution was adopted there was a clear conception of
the need for a federal jurisdiction in cases of diverse citizenship,1 and the
Constitution ultimately provided that:
The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in Law and Equity,
arising . . . between a State and citizens of another State;-
between citizens of different States,
The essence of diversity jurisdiction is the availability of federal tribunals
for controversies concerning matters which, in themselves, are outside the
domain of federal power and within state authority; and it is founded
1. Paul Howland, Shall Federal Jurisdiction of Controversies Between Citizens of
Different States Be Preserved, 18 A.B.A.J. 499, 500 (1932).
2. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
